Introduction
It is easy to imagine that the present -yesterday's tomorrow -was always the future expected in the past. Yet, what we now accept as the normal state of affairs -the present -was not the only possible outcome that could have come to pass nor was it often the most commonly expected one. What is now considered "inevitable" -when viewed from the vantage point of 20/20 hindsightwas often not immediately embraced or accepted.
In order to understand where we are going it is important to understand where we have been and how we got there.
I want to discuss some past visions of the future of financial markets, in general, and derivative markets, in particular, as seen by academics, practitioners and policymakers at various points in time. There are few advantages of age but one of them is the opportunity to witness changes and remember the contemporary context in which they occurred. I have been fortunate to have had a catbird seat to observe some of the changes in financial markets; first as a student of finance, and later with service: at a regulator;
at an exchange; as a trader; in academia. I will draw upon some of my recollections and personal experiences in the discussion that follows.
Most readers have always lived in a world where exchange traded derivatives on financial assets existed. Another fear at the time was that if trading in put options were permitted it would push down stock prices. This fear was powerful enough to cause the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to prohibit trading in put options for almost an additional 4 years. Thanks to this decision, putcall parity in U.S. exchange traded equity options remained a theoretical concept during those four years.
It is easy to imagine that exchange traded options began with the trading of equity options on the CBOE. However, it is important to note that exchange traded options did not begin with exchange traded equity options. Indeed, options on futures ("privileges") were once common on U.S. Exchange at the time. The contract that I was principally trading was the S&P 500 stock index futures which opened later than the two energy contracts that the CME decided to introduce in 1984 -unleaded gasoline and no. 2 heating oil. (The CME had obtained approval to trade crude oil futures but it held that contract in reserve to be introduced after CME gasoline and heating oil futures became successful.) To showcase the new energy futures markets, the CME decided to televise the opening live to a meeting of the American Petroleum Institute. Prior to the launch, the CME had a campaign to persuade locals to dedicate 15 minutes a day to make the contracts successful by providing the liquidity needed to attract public order flow.
Because the S&P 500 stock index futures opened later than the new energy futures markets, I decided to help make a market in unleaded gas and heating oil at the opening on the first day of trading. At the time, some observers blamed index arbitrage and portfolio insurance for the Crash. However, as the Brady Commission report showed index arbitrage was not the culprit. 6 There was also significantly less portfolio insurance induced trades than there might have been as many of the human portfolio managers did not send the portfolio insurance program generated sell orders to the market.
Despite the passage of considerable time, the causes of Crash remain unknown. 
Conclusions
Derivatives exist because they are needed. They facilitate price discovery and risk transference. As long as markets are volatile the outlook for derivatives markets will remain strong. The evolution of financial markets will certainly continue as the needs of market participants and technology changes. However, as we have seen with many past visions of the future, Yesterday's Tomorrows, our current perception of what financial markets will look like tomorrow, Today's Tomorrow, may be a poor predictor of what tomorrow's financial markets will actually look like and when seemingly inevitable changes will occur.
